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1Abstract
An Augmented Relative Price Spread (ARPS) model is employed to explain
recent changes in real US beef wholesale-retail (WR) and hence farm-retail (FR)
marketing margins. It is found that the surge in retail market concentration in
1999 most likely increased retail market oligopsony power relative to wholesale
oligopoly power, ultimately changing real US WR beef marketing margins. The
ﬁnding that higher oligopsony retail market power relative to oligopoly wholesale
market power in the US beef industry was most likely responsible for the changes
inUSWRmarketingmarginsin1999isimportantbecauseitprovidesaneconomic
justiﬁcation for policy makers to regulate anticompetitive conduct by beef retailers.
21 Introduction
The rise of supermarkets in the late twentieth century produced changes in the structure
and organization of many agricultural commodity markets in the US, Australia, the UK
and the developing world ((Cotterrill, 2006) and (Trail, 2006)). While some cost sav-
ings were realized from increasing retail market concentration, concerns remain about
inadvertent negative consequences of the rise of supermarkets. An example of retail
markets where negative effects of increasing concentration is of particular importance
is the US retail beef market where vigorous mergers and acquisitions activity by Ahold,
Safeway, Albertsons, Kroger and Wal-Mart in 1999 resulted in a highly consolidated
retail beef sector after 1999 (Marsh and Brester, 2004). Concurrent with the rapid
increase in retail market concentration in 1999, real US WR beef marketing margins
increased unexpectedly in 1999 suggesting that changes in the margins may have been
driven by events in the retail beef sector.
High retail beef market concentration may lead to increased oligopsony market
power for beef retailers compared to oligopoly market power of wholesalers enabling
them to manipulate wholesale beef prices. Since beef wholesalers will likely pass on
depressed beef prices to farmers as lower farm prices, farmers and wholesalers have
positive incentives to demand antitrust regulation of beef retailers provided it can be
established that the later practices anticompetitive conduct. This paper attempts to ﬁnd
out if the sharp rise in beef retail market concentration in 1999 resulted in the exercise
of higher retail relative to wholesale market power and further if this rise in relative
retail market power signiﬁcantly changed real US WR beef margins 1
1Although marketing margins and price spreads do not mean the same thing, the two series move together
32 Related Literature
The earliest method for identifying market power is credited to the Structure Conduct
Performance (SCP) approach pioneered by (Bain, 1951) and relies on the relation be-
tween proﬁts and markets concentration to identify market power 2 The more modern
NEIO approach employs the price-cost margin (PCM) model and criticizes the SCP
for having suspect econometric foundation. However the NEIO has itself been been
criticized for not performing any better than the SCP 3 The theoretical dependence of
marketing margins on different determinants particularly market power using NEIO
type models is laid out in (Wohlgenant, 2001) drawing heavily on (Appelbaum, 1982).
Identiﬁcation is established separately by Lau (1982) and (Bresnahan, 1989).
Two NEIO-based procedures have been used to investigate the effects of market
power on WR margins. Marsh and Brester examine the effects of retail market con-
centration, retail demand, farm input supply and marketing costs in the beef and pork
markets simultaneously using only WR speciﬁcations. In contrast, Capps et all, link
behavior in FW and WR for a speciﬁc commodity and allow for the exercise of market
power to emerge interactively in either of the decomposed margins. This is particularly
relevant in the beef market as research has demonstrated the presence of market power
at the wholesale level (i.e. the packers) which has resulted in lower producer prices.
Failure to decompose margin behavior may make it difﬁcult to identify the exercise of
and for this paper we assume they mean the same thing. The beef marketing margin is the difference in the
value of the animal product at two different stages of the beef supply chain. By contrast the price spread is
the difference between the buying price and selling price of the animal product.
2See (Choudhury, 2005) for a summary and synthesis of this literature.
3Digal and Ahmadi-Esfahani (2002) contrast the strengths and weaknesses of the NEIO model.
4market power at the retail level.
We use the Capps et all model and not the Marsh and Brester model because it
is particularly relevant, ﬂexible and is easy to modify and operationalize. Capps et
all use marketing costs, concentration, demand, and price data to determine the most
important factors affecting lamb margins. They conclude that packer concentration
and marketing costs positively impact margins. We modify the Capps et all model in
different ways to reﬂect more accurately the current US beef industry. The details are
in the theory section. Finally, since few analysis of US WR margins using post 1998
data exist, this research will ﬁll that void in the literature.
3 Theory Model and Methods
We develop the model used for our research in two stages. In stage 1, we describe the
base model, and, in stage 2, we modify the model to test for a possible structural break
in 1999 induced by changes in the retail beef market.
3.1 Stage 1: The Base Model and Determinants of the Marketing
Margins
Following Wholgenant (2001), the development of the base model begins by assum-
ing proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrms provide marketing services until the marginal value of the
services is identical to marginal costs (1),
(1)
M = MC(Q,C)
5where M is the marketing margin PF - PR, Q is the quantity of beef processed,
C is a vector of marketing inputs, and MC is the marginal cost of marketing services.
Equation (1) can be rearranged to provide a relative price spread model (2),
(2)
M = PR ∗ MC(Q,C/PR) = PF − PR
where PR and PF are beef prices at retail and at the farm expressed in retail weight
equivalents and measured in cents per pound. In linear form, (2) can be expressed as
(3),
Mt = β1PRt + β2PRtQt + β3ICt + et
where Qt is per capita quantity of beef produced, ICt is an index of marketing costs,
and et is a random error term. To investigate margin behavior at retail, it is useful
to decompose the margin equation into farm-wholesale and wholesale-retail margins
which leads directly to the augmented relative price spread (ARPS) framework (Capps,
et al.). Here, we further modify the ARPS model by including the price of substitute
pork, a measure of labor productivity, and four-ﬁrm concentration ratios in linear and
non-linear form. Researchers have shown that it is important to include the price of a
substitute in commodity models, and the use of a productivity measure should make
it possible to identify the changes in margins associated with changes in processing
and marketing technology (Marsh and Brewster). Further, Digal and Esfahani argue
that the relationship between performance and market power may be more accurately
represented in a non-linear fashion. Finally, we allow for possible changes in the level
of the margin after 1999, by including dummy variables (Di) in each equation. The
dummy if signiﬁcant will signal a change in the underlying data generating process
6of the marketing margins Equations (4) and (5) provide the decomposed FW and WR
speciﬁcations used in the analysis,
(4)MF W t =λ1PW t+λ2CONSt+λ3(PW t∗CONSt)+λ4ICWt+λ5(TOP4W)t+
λ6LPRODWt + Di + λ7SQTOP4Rt + λ8SWt + υ1t
(5)MW Rt =a1PRt+a2CONSt+a3(PRt∗CONSt)t+a4ICRt+a5(TOP4R)t+
a6LPRODRt + Di + a7SQTOP4Wt + a8SRt + υ2t
Where for (4) and (5), (Mjkt) is the quarterly j to k beef marketing margin in cent
per lb retail weight equivalent, and j, k represent farm, wholesale or retail. Furthermore
CONS is quarterly consumption of beef per capita, ICW and ICR represent indices of
wholesale and retail marketing cost and are measured by wholesale and retail labor
costs respectively. (TOP4R) and (TOP4W) are the four ﬁrm concentration ratios
in the beef packing and retail grocery industry respectively. LPRODW and LPRODR
measure labor productivity at wholesale and retail respectively. SW and SR are the
real prices of wholesale beef and retail beef substitute pork respectively. Table E in the
Appendix contains the theoretically consistent predictions about the signs of the rela-
tion between the explanatory variables and the FW and WR margins respectively. The
variables are expected to have similar effects on FW and WR beef marketing margins.
Below we only provide explanations of the predict of the signs of the determinants of
the WR margin as we focus mainly on the WR margin because it makes up 80 percent
of the FR margin.
73.2 Effect of Retail concentration a5 on WR Margin
A surge in retail grocery market concentration in the US may increase, or decrease WR
margins. Therefore the sign of the coefﬁcient a5 in (5) is theoretically indeterminate ex
ante but is determined by the underlying econometrics. For the speciﬁc case of the US
beef sector, it has been found that increasing retail concentration increases WR mar-
gins. Hall, Schmitz, and Cothern (1979), Wohlgenant and Mullen (1987) and Marsh
and Brester (2004) all analyzed US beef marketing margins and the effect of increas-
ing retail market concentration on margins at different times using different ranges of
data. They all conclude that increasing retail market concentration increases US beef
marketing margins. A positive and signiﬁcant relation is therefore expected between
the TOP4R variable and WR margins, so a5 in (5) is expected to be positive.
3.3 Effect of increasing retail price a1 on the WR margin
All else equal, an increase in retail price will increase WR margins. Hall, Schimtz
and Cotthern (1979), Wohlgenant and Mullen (1987) and Marsh and Brester (2004)
analyzed US beef marketing margins at different times using different ranges of data.
They all conclude that retail price increases usually widen WR margins.
3.4 Effect of productivity at retail a6 on the WR margin
Increasing (decreasing) productivity at retail will result in decreased (increased) WR
margin. The data however clearly shows a positive trend in labor productivity since
1999 (see ﬁg 3) so we surmise that the coefﬁcient (a6) that captures the relationship
between retail productivity and the WR margin will be negative.
83.5 Effect of retail marketing service costs a4 on the WR margin
When input cost of providing retail market services increase, the WR increase (Marsh
and Brester 2004). For example, if the demand for boneless beef and delicatessens
increase relative to the demand for ordinary plain beef, the cost of marketing services
or the wage increases and the WR margin will increase. The reverse is true when
consumer-tailored retail beef demand decreases (Hahn, 2004). From graph ﬁg 3 in the
appendix, marketing service is trending up throughout the range of estimation. The
econometric evidence also favors a positive relationship between retail marketing and
the WR marketing margin. Hall Lana, Schmitz Andrew, and James Cothern, (1979),
Wohlgenant and Mullen (1987), and Marsh and Brester 2004) all found a positive rela-
tionship between retail marketing costs and the WR margin. Consequently, we expect
the coefﬁcient a4 in (5) to be positive and signiﬁcant.
4 Data
Table A in the Appendix contains the deﬁnitions of the main variables used, the sym-
bol used to represent the variables, the unit of measurement as well as the mean and
standard deviations of the variables. All price-related variables in this table are real,
deﬂated by the US CPI. Nominal data for the three beef margins MF W, MW R and
MF R as well as prices at the farm (PR), wholesale (PW), retail (PR) and prices of
substitutes at wholesale and retail (SW and SR) were all obtained from the Economics
Research Service (ERS) of the USDA. The historical margin and price data are posted
9on the ERS website in monthly frequency 4 SAS was used to convert the data to quar-
terly frequency. The quarterly prices are thus simple averages of the monthly prices
and the monthly prices are simple average prices for the particular months. Note that
while Capps et all use de-seasonalized price and margin data, we do not. Capps, Byrne
and Gary Williams (1995) argued use de-seasonalized data because they are interested
in inter-year as opposed to intra-year trends in the margins. We do not de-seasonalize
the data preferring to let the seasonality in a particular series explain the seasonality
in other series. Tables B in the Appendix contains summary statistics for the nominal
price data. As expected the nominal retail price is approximately equal to the sum of
nominal wholesale and farm prices. Table C displays CPI deﬂated retail, wholesale
and farm prices as well as real FW, WR and FR margins. As expected, the real FR
is approximately equal to the sum of the real FW and WR margins. Tables D and E
on the other hand contain correlation matrices of the independent variables in equa-
tions (4) and (5) respectively. A look at these correlation matrices does not give much
cause to worry unduly about multicollinearity since none of the correlations are equal
to 1. To estimate the effect of increasing consumption on WR margins quarterly data
on US consumption of beef per capita was also obtained from the ERS. BLS’s aver-
4Although there are many different signiﬁcant players along the vertical beef supply chain we assume for
simplicity that there are only three main players farmers, wholesale beef packers and retailers so the only
relevant prices are the farm price, the wholesale price and the retail price. Note also that the farm price is
essentially the average slaughter price of beef, the wholesale price is the average beef packer price and the
retail price is essentially the grocery store price of beef. Nominal prices at wholesale retail and farm were all
converted into retail equivalent weight (c/lb) using conversion factors: 1.14lbs of wholesale beef per pound
of retail beef and 2.4lbs of live choice steer per lb of retail beef.
10age hourly wage at wholesale is used to measure marketing costs at wholesale after
deﬂating with US CPI. Similarly BLS’s seasonally adjusted employment cost index
for retail grocery stores is used to measure retail marketing costs after deﬂating it with
the CPI. We ignore other variable costs at wholesale and retail such as energy costs
because it constitute a smaller portion of total costs and is assumed to be proportional
to output (Antle, 2000). Next, we utilize the BLS index of retail labor productivity for
grocery stores to capture the contribution of retail productivity to WR margins. Data
for the four ﬁrm concentration ratios (CR4) at retail was obtained from the different
annual versions (1995-2004) of (Lazich, 2006)’s Market Power Reporter references at
the end of this paper. Since the retail concentration data was only available annually, a
short program was written using time series software called the Forecasting, Analysis
and Modeling Environment (FAME) to convert the annual data to quarterly frequency
using Cubic-Spline-Interpolation. Packer Concentration data was obtained from the
current and previous issues of Packers and Stockyards Statistical Report. Retail market
concentration obtained from the ERS was also compared to the FAME generated data
but differences were minor.
5 Estimation Procedure
Recall that OLS regression using non-stationary data yields spurious results (Granger
and Newbold, 1974). To ensure that all explanatory variables were stationary, unit root
tests of stationarity were performed for all the independent variables in (4) and (5)
using the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) testing procedure in STATA. The AKAIKE
11criterion was then employed to select the appropriate number of lags. In other words
models with no constant and no trends (NCNT) were compared to models with no
constant but with a trend (NCT). The NCT models were analyzed ﬁrst. We checked to
see if the trend was signiﬁcant or not in the NCT model. If the trend was signiﬁcant,
NCT was the right model. The AKAIKE criterion was then used to select the optimal
lag length. If the trend was not signiﬁcant then the NCNT model was preferred to
the NCT model 5 Before including variables and interactions of variables to perform
tests of structural break we verify that equation (5) essentially captures the trends WR
marketing margins by estimating (5) by OLS regression. Technically (4) and (5) could
be correctly estimated equation by equation using OLS assuming that the assumption
concerning the error terms are satisﬁed and that OLS is indeed BLUE. We only report
test results from the WR equation since this is our focus but carry out identical tests
on the FW margins. To obtain a handle on just how biased or inefﬁcient initial OLS
equations of the WR retail margins is, we subjected it to a battery of tests. First to
ensure the absence of serial correlation, correlograms of the error term were generated
and analyzed (chart 1 in Appendix). The Breusch and Pagan (1994) LM test was also
used to test for AR (p) serial correlation. The alternate Durbin Watson test for serial
correlation is not applicable in this case because the margins are estimated without a
5In the event that all the independent variables of the WR margin were non-stationary but the error is
stationary the margin equation is co-integrated. Recall also that in the case of more than two variables in a
cointegration relationship the coefﬁcients will not display asymptotic t-distributions except if the right hand
side variables are independent and there exists a single co-integrating vector ((Enders, 1994). p. 380): other-
wise F-tests are invalid. In other words the possibility of the existence of multiple cointegration relationships
requires that the set of independent variables of each margin relationship must be necessarily independent.
12constant term (Draper and Smith, 1981). The Breusch and Pagan (1994) LM test for
heteroskedasticy was also applied. Finally a test of functional form misspeciﬁcation,
speciﬁcallyatestforomittedvariableswasperformed. TheOLSestimationsoftheWR
margin are heteroskedastic but not autocorrelated. The OLS estimates were therefore
corrected for heteroskedasicty by using White’s heteroskedastic robust estimator.
As correctly identiﬁed by Capps, Oral, Byrne Patrick and Gary Williams (1995),
non-zero cross equation correlations are possible between the error terms in equation
(4) and (5). If such cross correlation do exist then Seemingly Unrelated Regression
(SURE) provides a more precise or efﬁcient estimate compared to OLS (Wooldridge,
2003). However, if the retail price in (5) is endogenous in the WR marketing margin,
3SLS is preferred to 2SLS. We use Hausman’s (1974) test to test for endogeneity of PR
in the WR marketing margin equation given by (5) (see Tale K.1). The result veriﬁed
that the null hypothesis of strict exogeneity of the independent variables must be be
rejected. Consequently estimation of (4) and (5) is by three stage least squares (3SLS).
6 Stage 2: Testing for Structural Break
Using our modiﬁed version of the Caps et all ARPS model, we test for structural break
tests based on the hypothesis that unexpected increase in retail concentration resulted
in the exercise of higher oligopsony power relative to oligopoly power to such an extent
that a signiﬁcant change occurred in WR margins in 1999. Positive results from our
structural break test will conﬁrm our hypothesis that the possible structural break in
1999 was indeed due to the unexpected surge in retail concentration in 1999. Specif-
13ically, we hypothesize that the unexpected increase in retail market concentration in
1999 which was caused by the emergence of Wal-Mart as the retail industry leader
in 1999 might have caused a fundamental change in the retail beef sector. We follow
Capps, Oral, Byrne Patrick and Gary Williams (1995) and include TOP4RD as a slope
shifter for the WR margin. TOP4RD = (CR4 at retail)*D where D = 0 before 1999
and D = 1 after 1999. We argue that the rapid emergence of Wal-Mart as an indus-
try leader increased CR4 at retail as Wal-Mart increased its own Market share from
virtually zero before 1999 to almost 10 percent by 1999 and to 20 percent by 2004
Lazich (2004). This potentially fundamentally changed the retail beef environment.
We perform this test using both the OLS and the 3SLS estimators. We had to deﬁne
a corresponding slope shifter for the FW margin for the 3SLS estimators. TOP4WD
is a slope shifter for the WR margin. TOP4WD = (CR4 at wholesale )*D where D
= 0 before 1999 and D = 1 after 1999. A signiﬁcant coefﬁcient of this slope-shifter
interaction dummy variable is evidence of a fundamental change in the data generating
process of the WR margins caused by the change in the retail market sector.
7 Results
We ﬁrst present the results of the robust OLS version of Capps, Byrnes, and Williams
(1995), model executed using our data with the only modiﬁcation being to add the
dummy for 1999 in order to determine if the model captures the underlying character-
istics of the real WR beef marketing margin. From Table I, most variables have the
expected signs but not all variable are signiﬁcant at 5 percent signiﬁcance level. In par-
14ticular, the dummy for 1999 and the retail market concentration variable are positive
and signiﬁcant at 5 percent signiﬁcance level suggesting that model is at least cap-
turing the underlying WR relationship. The positive and signiﬁcant dummy for 1999
suggests that the data generating process (DGP) of the WR margin changed in 1999.
By contrast, marketing costs and beef consumption are not signiﬁcantly related to the
WR margins at 5 percent signiﬁcance. However, since the R-square for the regression
is reasonably high (0.69), as a set, the explanatory variable explain a lot of the variation
in the WR margins. The results of the OLS of our modiﬁed version of Capps’s ARPS
model (corrected for heretoskedasticity) is displayed in Table J. The retail market con-
centration parameter and the dummy for 1999 are again positive and signiﬁcant which
is as we expect from the reasons given under the discussion of expected signs. Marsh
and Brester, Wolhlgenant and Mullen (1987) and Hall et all (1979) also ﬁnd that mar-
ket concentration is positively related to WR beef marketing margins using different
ranges of data. The R-square for the regression is again reasonably high; about 0.7
so the set of explanatory variables cannot explain only 30 percent of the variation in
the WR margin. Paradoxically the productivity variable is positive but we expect it to
be negative given that the retail productivity has been increasing since 1999. Increas-
ing retail productivity should logically increase the input cost of preparing retail beef
thereby decreasing the retail price without necessarily decreasing the wholesale price.
It follows therefore that increasing retail productivity should decrease not increase WR
margins. Although Marsh and Brester (2004) also conclude that retail productivity is
positively and signiﬁcantly related to WR margins, they conclude that productivity is
positively related to WR margins because productivity was declining over the range of
15their estimation. For the reason that the sign of the productivity result is not consistent
with theoretical prediction the main theoretically reasonable explanation for the posi-
tive surge in marketing margins remain the surge in market concentration. The fact that
retail market concentration is positive and signiﬁcant provides the preliminary answer
to our ﬁrst research question: what are the important factors affecting margins? A rea-
sonable preliminary answer is precisely retail market power emanating from increase
retail concentration. Re-estimating the model after eliminating outliers and using SR-
CONS instead of PRCONS to achieve identiﬁcation where SRCONS is the interaction
of the consumption and retail pork price variable (not reported) does not change the
results signiﬁcantly because the retail market concentration remains positive and sig-
niﬁcant at 5 percent conﬁdence level. Unlike the conclusions from Capps Byrnes and
Williams and Marsh and Brester’s models, Table K.1 conﬁrms that the Hausman en-
dogeneiy test to determine the endogeneity of retail price in the WR margin rejects
the null null of exogeneity of retail price. We there correctly estimate the system by
3SLS instead of ITSURE. From Table K.2 which contains the 3SLS results, focusing
on the WR margin coefﬁcients in the lower half of the table we see that the retail mar-
ket concentration coefﬁcient is positive and signiﬁcant at 5 percent signiﬁcance level
as expected and in conformity with the OLS results. However although the retail price
and marketing costs variables have the expected sign they are not signiﬁcant at 5 per-
cent signiﬁcance level. The structural break dummy is also positive and signiﬁcant.
It seems plausible to argue therefore that an increase in market concentration was the
key determinant of marketing margins especially given that a positive coefﬁcient on
the productivity variable will narrow not widen margins. Using the conjectural varia-
16tions argument due to Appelbaum (1982), an increase in market concentration typically
increases market power. We argue that the unexpected increase in retail market concen-
tration which increased retail oligopsony power relative to wholesale oligopoly power
is the most likely reason why WR margins changed in 1999. We concede that the lit-
erature on beef marketing margins using pre-1998 data ascribes a minor role to market
power as a determinant of WR margin. We however argue that that our ﬁnding of a
larger role for retail market power using our more recent data set that includes 1998
while at variance with the previous ﬁnding necessarily has to be different because of
the increasing importance of retail market power more recently. The formal tests of
structural lends more support to our conjectures: From the results of the Wal-Mart in-
spired slope shifter structural break test in Table M using 3SLS regression, it is clear
that the slope shifter variable is signiﬁcant at 5 percent. This conﬁrms our hypothesis
that the changes in the WR margins is inspired by a change in retail market concentra-
tion. On calculating elasticity of transmissions from wholesale to retail and from retail
to the farm following exactly the formula provided by Capps et all (1995), we obtain
values of 0.7 for the former which indicates presence of market power and 1.0 for the
later calculations which suggests the absence of market power.
8 Conclusions and Challenges for Future Research
Although labor productivity at retail, marketing costs and retail prices all changed in
the range of data analysis the variation in these determinants of marketing margins do
not explain the changes in WR margins in 1999. This is because labor productivity
17increased not decreased during the period and should therefore decrease not increase
margins. The price and marketing variables were not signiﬁcantly related to the real
WR margins at 5 percent signiﬁcance so they did not change margins much. A theoret-
ically reasonable explanation for the increase in marketing margins in 1999 is provided
by the increase in retail oligposony market power emanating form increased retail mar-
ket concentration that occurred around the same same time. The OLS and 3SLS ver-
sions of the modiﬁed ARPS both support this result. Further evidence is provided by
the Wal-mart inspired test of structural break. Finally recall that the elasticity of trans-
mission from retail to wholesale and from wholesale to the farm gives us an indication
of the sensitivity of the farm price to changes in the wholesale price and the sensitiv-
ity of the wholesale price to the retail price. The value of 0.7 translates into exercise
of retail market power because in the absence of market power the elasticity of trans-
mission is close to 1.0 one as recorded for the farm-wholesale transmission elasticity.
Despite the evidence of exercise of retail power, caution should be exercised in the use
of the research results to guide policy decisions because some determinants of market-
ing were not included in this research the most important of which is risk. As Azzam
(1997) has outlined, when risk is included in the analysis of margins the results often
changes. However since the variance of the retail price before and after 1999 appear
to be similar we expect risk to have a limited role in explaining WR margins. The
contribution to market power due to changing variety, time and quality were also not
considered in depth. (Demsetz, 1973) argues that increasing retail market concentra-
tion reduces cost as well as increasing market concentration so the two effects must be
appropriately decomposed. Further research needs to address these issues. Recall also
18that only domestically produced beef was used in this analysis and beef consumed at
fastfood outlets was ignored; it might be instructive to see what effect importation and
exportation of beef and beef consumed at fastfood outlets have on US beef marketing
margins. A ﬁnal but very pertinent challenge for future research is the collection of
quality national retail market concentration data at a high frequency since the result of
this kind of research hinges critically on minimizing errors in the collection of the data.
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Table A: Variable Definition and Summary Statistics 
 
SYMBOL Variable Description Mean
MFW Farm-Wholesale Margin, c/lb Deflated 0.18
(0.04)
MWR Wholesale-Retail Margin, c/lb, Deflated 0.8
(0.08)
PR Retail Price, c/lb, Deflated 1.87
(0.15)
PW Wholesale Price, c/lb, Deflated 1.07
(0.09)
PF Farm price, c/lb, Deflated 0.8
(0.08)
CONS Consumption of Beef Per Capita 16.62
(0.08)
ICW Index of Wholesale Cost, Deflated, $ 0.09
(0.003)
ICR Index of Retail Cost, Deflated, $ 0.5
(0.014)
TOP4R Top 4 concentration ratio for Groceries, % 24.4
(9.65)
TOP4W Top4 Packer Concentration Ratio, % 68.6
(2.52)
PRODW Productivity at wholesale, output/hr 109.3
(20.56)
PRODR Productivity at retail, output/hr 103.9
(4.6)
YEAR Measure of technology 23.5
SW Price of Substitute Pork at Wholesale, c/lb, Deflated 0.66
(0.01)




Table B: Descriptive Statistics of Nominal Beef Prices 
 
Variable Mean c/lb Std Dev Volatility N
Farm Price 152.73 21.85 0.143063 46
Wholesale Price 182.9 27.22 0.15 46








Table C: Descriptive Statistics of Real Beef Prices and Margins 
 
Variable Mean c/lb Std Dev Volatility N
Farm Price 0.8 0.08 0.1 46
Wholesale Price 1.07 0.09 0.08 46
Retail Price 1.87 0.15 0.08 46
Farm-Wholesale Margin 0.18 0.04 0.22 46
Wholesale-Retail margin 0.8 0.08 0.1 46  
 
 
Table D: Correlation Matrix for Independent Variables of the Farm-Wholesale Margin 
 
 
      PW TOP4W ICW SW SQTOP4W CONS PWCONS
PW 1
TOP4W 0.137566 1
ICW 0.177859 -0.075335 1
SW 0.041928 0.131623 -0.6389 1
SQTOP4W 0.151876 0.998318 -0.0622 0.1204 1
CONS 0.293255 0.234776 0.60049 -0.203 0.24490732 1
PWCONS 0.915942 0.204982 0.39593 -0.0538 0.22088345 0.6513 1  
 
 
Table E: Correlation Matrix for Independent Variables of the Wholesale-Retail Margin 
 
 
PR ICR TOP4R SR CONS PRCONS
PR 1
ICR 0.276279 1
TOP4R -0.341237 -0.839248 1
SR -0.097763 0.389003 -0.150553 1
CONS 0.349963 0.599573 -0.618572 0.181419 1













Table E: Expected sign of Coefficient in the margin equations 
 
 













































TABLE G: Stationarity Tests of All Key Variables in the FW and WR Margins 
 
 
Variable # of lags using  Trend is 5% critical Ho: Series is
Definition AKAIKE criterion significant Value= - 1.950 Non-Sationary
MFW 2 NO -0.095 ACCEPT
MWR 1 NO -0.49 ACCEPT
ERROR(MFW) 3 NO -2.1 REJECT
ERROR(MWR) 4 NO -2 REJECT
PR 2 NO -1.6 ACCEPT
PW 1 NO -2.28 REJECT
PF 4 NO -1.08 ACCEPT
CONS 8 NO -1.359 ACCEPT
ICW 2 NO -1.02 ACCEPT
ICR 2 NO -0.98 ACCEPT
TOP4R 3 NO -0.925 ACCEPT
TOP4W 4 NO -1.2 ACCEPT
PRODW 3 NO -1.502 ACCEPT
PRODR 2 NO -0.45 ACCEPT
YEAR 1 NO -0.2 ACCEPT
SW 2 NO -0.97 ACEPT










Fcritical = 3.0 and Fstatistic = [8, 46 - (2*8)] = F [8, 20] = [3.00]
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Table H: Battery of Test for the WR Margin (OLS) 
 
Table H.1 Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
         Ho: Constant variance 
         Variables: fitted values of WR 
 
         Chi-Sq(1)          =     3.94 
         Prob > Chi-Sq   =   0.0473  
Conclusion: Reject Ho so model is heteroskedastic 
 
Table H.2 Breusch-Godfrey LM test for autocorrelation 
 
Lags(p) Chi-Sq DF Pob Chi-sq
1 0.072 1 0.788
2 0.096 2 0.95
3 0.395 3 0.94
4 0.92 4 0.92
5 2.4 5 0.8  
                        Ho: no serial correlation 
Conclusion: Accept Ho so model is not serially correlated 
 
Table H.3 Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of WR 
Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                  F(3, 36)   =      0.43 
                  Prob > F  =      0.7318.  
Conclusion:  Accept Ho: model is well specified 
29labelbpr:FIG10
TABLE I: Heteroskedasticity consistent OLS regression results for the WR US beef 
















Robust t statistics  in parenthesis
* significant at 5% ** significant at 1%  
 






















Robust t statistics  in parenthesis






TABLE K.1:  Endogeneity test  
Tests of endogeneity of: PR
Ho: Regressor is exogenous
    Wu-Hausman F test:                   P-value = 0.00114
    Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-sq test:   P-value = 0.00048  
Conclusion: Reject Ho. Conclude Price is endogenous in the WR equation 
 















































































Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses     
Significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%     
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